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EROS, CIVILIZATION AND THE
BURGER COURT*
THOMAS C. GREYt
I want to offer an interpretation of one aspect of the Burger Court's deci-
sions concerning sex, marriage and the family. This area of constitutional law
is almost entirely the creation of the Burger Court and it seems to puzzle
many people. The puzzle is a double one: why did a conservative Court get
into this area at all? And once it got in, why hasn't it carried through with its
project, by invalidating the laws that interfere with the private sex lives of
consenting adults?
The decisions I have in mind have largely been decided under the consti-
tutional "right of privacy" introduced by the Warren Court's decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court invalidated a Connecticut law pro-
hibiting the use of contraceptives, even by married couples.' Of course,
Griswold was not the first contact between the Constitution and the law gov-
erning family and sexual relations. In the twenties the Court had invalidated
two state laws regulating educational practices as unduly restrictive of parental
child-rearing authority.2 Then, during the forties, the Court had struck down
an Oklahoma sterilization statute under the equal protection clause while ob-
serving that marriage and procreation were among "the basic civil rights of
man;"'3 and had upheld a child labor statute as applied to young religious
proselytizers only after observing that there was a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter. ' 4 But these were isolated decisions and dicta,
never grouped into a common category before Griswold.
By contrast, the obscenity cases were a recognized collective entity. Since
the middle of the fifties, the Court had struggled to establish constitutional
limits on the public censorship of pornography.' But obscenity law never fell
into the category of sex and the family; rather it was conceptualized by the
courts and commentators as a traditional problem of freedom of expression,
pitting the police powers against the free exchange of ideas. At least one critic
noted that the obscenity problem was more one of regulating sin than of cen-
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soring ideas.6 But the slippery slope from pornography prohibition to sup-
pression of Boccaccio and Joyce was still a live problem in the fifties and early
sixties, and in any case the comforting absolutes of the first amendment pro-
vided such solidly literal support for the opponents of obscenity prosecutions
that no one accepted the invitation to reclassify the problem as one of morals
legislation.
The Griswold decision made a great splash among academics. For one
thing, it revived the question of substantive due process and unenumerated
rights. But beyond that, the case apparently injected into constitutional law
the debate that had arisen out of the recommendations made by the
Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code against criminalizing private
adult sexual behavior.7 I say that Griswold had apparently injected this issue
into constitutional law because the commentators immediately saw the case
that way. In their view, Griswold marked the first step in the con-
stitutionalization of some contemporary version of John Stuart Mill's prin-
ciple of liberty-perhaps the version then recently proposed by H.L.A. Hart
in his much-discussed debate with Lord Devlin. s Mill's principle, of course,
was that the only legitimate reason for state coercion is to prevent harm to
others. Hart's revision would have weakened the principle to allow paternalis-
tic laws, while keeping Mill's condemnation of purely moralistic restraints,
such as the common prohibitions of sodomy, fornication and adultery.
An obstacle to the Millian reading of Griswold was the Court's focus upon
marital privacy as the constitutional value infringed by the Connecticut birth
control law. 9 But this obstacle was apparently removed by the Court's 1972
decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, which extended Griswold to strike down anti-
contraceptive laws as they applied to unmarried adults.il This development
was apparently confirmed and strengthened by the 1973 decision in Roe v.
Wade, which invoked the right of privacy to protect the free choice of
unmarried as well as married women to obtain abortions.'" The Millian inter-
pretation has been nudged along earlier by the decision in Stanley v.
Georgia,12 in which the Court had combined the right of privacy with freedom
of expression to establish that each individual had a constitutional right to
possess even obscene material in his home without legal interference.13
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Griswold and its progeny were thus read as leading toward a constitutional
right of sexual freedom. There was, then, general surprise and dismay when,
in 1976, the Court summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding a
Virginia sodomy statute against an attack by adult homosexuals who claimed
that, as applied to their private sexual acts, it violated their right to privacy. 14
For example, my colleague, Gerald Gunther said that the summary treat-
ment of the case was "irresponsible" and "lawless."' 5 In an extensive recent
study, David Richards asks:
... [H]ow can the Court in a principled way sustain the constitutional right to
privacy of married and unmarried people to use contraceptives or to have
abortions or to use pornography in the privacy of one's home, and not sustain
the rights of consenting adult homosexuals to engage in the form of sex they
find natural? 6
To offer an oblique answer to that question, I want to look at the Su-
preme Court's own quite different version of Griswold. The Griswold opinions
contained no hint of any endorsement of the sexual freedom of consenting
adults. Three of the concurring opinions expressly disavowed any notion that
the right of privacy cast constitutional doubt on sex laws."' The opinion for
the Court, by Justice Douglas, stressed the ancient and sacred character of
iarriage as the basis for the decision.' 8 The most articulate opinion, Justice
Harlan's earlier dissent in Poe v. Ullman, which he incorporated by reference
into his Griswold concurrence, elaborated an entirely tradition-centered ratio-
nale for constitutional protection of marriage.' 9
Much of the Court's subsequent involvement with sex and the family has
followed its original stress on tradition as the source of constitutional rights in
this area. The Court has, for example, said that restrictions on the right to
marry must have substantial justification, though it seems clear that traditional
restrictions such as those prohibiting incestuous and polygamous marriage will
not be placed in doubt, however little secular or utilitarian justification they
may have. 20 It has upheld the privilege of traditional and conservative Amish
communities to have their children excused from the requirements of state
14. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affirming 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975). One judge dissented in the District Court, and Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens
urged that the appeal should be set for oral argument by the Supreme Court.
15. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76 (2 ed. Supp. 1976) (quoting N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
1976).
16. D. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human
Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 957, 958 (1979).
17. Griswold, supra note 1, at 498 (opinion of Goldberg, J.; constitutionality of adultery and
fornication statutes "beyond doubt"); id. at 505 (opinion of White, J.); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 553 (1961) (opinion of Harlan, J., incorporated by reference in his concurring opinion in
Griswold, supra note I at 500).
18. Griswold, supra note 1, at 486.
19. 367 U.S. 497, 551-55 (1961).
20. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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compulsory education laws, while indicating that similar privileges will not be
extended to progressive or utopian communities, religious or secular.2" It has
shielded the traditional family from the zoning laws,2 2 while withholding com-
parable protection from households made up of unrelated persons.2 3 And it
has reaffirmed traditional parental authority over children,2 4 though with im-
portant exceptions in the areas of contraception and abortion.2 5
At the same time, the Court has given no support to the notion that the
right of privacy protects sexual freedom. Not only has the homosexuals' chal-
lenge been summarily rejected, but in addition the Court has bypassed a num-
ber of chances to make a first incursion into the fantastic array of American
laws that have traditionally forbidden virtually all sexual expression except
wedded missionary-position intercourse. For example, the Court has within
the last decade twice upheld, summarily but with full opinions, two of the lu-
dicrous "crime against nature" sodomy statutes against void- for-vagueness at-
tacks. In the first case, the Court unanimously sustained a Florida statute that
had been struck down on vagueness grounds by the state's supreme court!
2 6
In the other case, from Tennessee, the defendant was charged with
cunnilingus, an act not within the traditional common law definition of sod-
omy. No Tennessee court had ever construed the Tennessee statute to cover
this act. The vagueness challenge was rejected nevertheless, because a
Tennessee court had once approvingly cited a Maine decision which had con-
strued Maine's sodomy statute to encompass cunnilingus-even though the
Tennessee decision had not referred to that aspect of the Maine case. 7
21. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
22. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
23. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
24. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
25. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Although the
Court strikes down the requirement of parental consent for abortion by a minor, it reiterates that
"the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society").
26. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973). The case involved two habeas corpus challenges
to sodomy convictions obtained under the Florida statute, which proscribed "the abominable and
detestable crime against nature," with a maximum punishment of twenty years imprisonment.
After the convictions became final, the Florida Supreme Court held the sodomy statute void for
vagueness, Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971), but held that its ruling would not be ap-
plied retroactively. The Fifth Circuit held that the petitioners in this case should have federal
habeas relief, 478 F. 2d 390 (5th Cir. 1973). On the state's appeal of that decision, the Supreme
Court summarily reversed, noting that it was not bound by the Florida Court's vagueness ruling.
The case is discussed in Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 560
(1976).
27. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). In this truly extraordinary case, the Court reached out
to grant certiorari and to summarily reverse a decision of the Sixth Circuit, 514 F.2d 570 (1975),
granting federal habeas corpus on vagueness grounds. The statute proscribed "crimes against na-
ture, either with mankind or any beast," punishable by a sentence of between five and fifteen
years imprisonment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-707 (1955). At common law, sodomy had encompassed
only anal intercourse and bestiality. A number of jurisdictions have broadened vague sod-
omy statutes to include oral intercourse. But whether this includes cunnilingus as well as fellatio
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In another recent case, the Court declined to review a decision upholding
the sodomy conviction of a husband and wife for an act of fellatio with each other.
The charge was evidently brought because photographs of the act taken by a
third party had fallen into the hands of the couple's children, and a convic-
tion for the appropriate offense-child abuse-had been reversed on appeal
by the state courts. 28 In the last case I shall mention, the Court denied certio-
rari from a decision upholding the discharge of two public library employees
for adulterous cohabitation, where the woman had become pregnant and the
man had moved in with her before obtaining a divorce from his wife. 2 9
These cases strongly suggest that the Court meant what it said in Griswold:
that the right of privacy protects only the historically sanctified institutions of
marriage and the family, and has no implication for laws regulating sexual ex-
pression outside of tranditional marriage. But what, then, is to be made of
Eisenstadt and its successor contraception cases, of the Abortion Cases, and of
Stanley v. Georgia? Do they not at least establish that the Court has been of two
minds in the areas of sex and the family-divided between the traditionalist
viewpoint expressed in Griswold on the one hand, and a modern, rationalist,
individualist outlook reflecting the perspective of J.S. Mill, Professor Hart,
is an unanswered question in this curious branch of jurisprudence; a number of courts have held
that "penetration" is an element of the offense, thus exluding this act, while still others have
found that "emission" is required. See Note supra note 26, at 556 n. 18, for elucidation, with case
citations. Although there was no prior Tennessee ruling on the cunnilingus question, the Su-
preme Court found that the vagueness problem was solved by Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811
(Tenn. 1959), which had quoted from a Maine decision, State v. Cyr, 198 A. 743 (Me. 1938), to
the effect that "the prohibition brings all unnatural copulation with mankind or a beast, including
sodomy, within its scope." The Maine statute in question had been construed earlier to cover
cunnilingus, though the Tennessee court did not mention this.
Justice Brennan observed in dissent that it was "difficult to recall a more patent instance of ju-
dicial irresponsibility." 423 U.S. at 54. The case involved not a consensual act, but coerced
cunnilingus; the unappealing facts might explain a failure by the Court to reach out to strike
down the applicattion of the statute, but the Court's exerting itself to save the conviction is inex-
plicable except as the expression of a firm resolve to stress the immunity of sexual morals legisla-
tion as such from constitutional challenge.
28. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). The case arose on federal habeas, and the lower courts went to
fantastic lengths to sustain the convictions in the teeth of Griswold, which everyone has agreed at
the very least prohibits prosecuting married couples for their "unnatural" sex acts. The District
Court held that the Lovisis had "waived" their right of marital privacy b' their negligence in fail-
ing to keep close enough guard over the Polaroid photographs of their sexual acts. The Court of
Appeals found "waiver" in the fact that a third person, not part of the marital unit, was present.
Both rationales are no more than puns on the perhaps unfortunate term "privacy" that the Court
has used to designate the rights involved in Griswold and its successors.
The state conviction of Aldo Lovisi for child abuse was reversed by the Virginia Supreme
Court because of a technical error in the charge to the jury. Lovisi v. Commonwealth, 188 S.E. 2d
206 (Va. 1972). Lovisi's siep-daughters, aged eleven and thirteen, had testified that they had been
present at the orgy, and had taken the pictures. The Lovisis and their sexual partner denied this:
the children admitted that they disliked their stepfather and would prefer to see their mother
and stepfather in prison so that they could live with their father. See 363 F. Supp. at 626 n. 3.
29. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 99 S. Ct. 734 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
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and the libertarian draftsmen of the Model Penal Code and Wolfenden Re-
port on the other?
I believe that the contraception and abortion cases, and Stanley are, like the
general run of the Court's decisions in this area, dedicated to the cause of so-
cial stability through the reinforcement of traditional institutions and have
nothing to do with the sexual liberation of the individual. The contraception
and abortion cases are simply family planning cases. They represent two
standard conservative views: that social stability is threatened by excessive
population growth; and that family stability is threatened by unwanted preg-
nancies, with their accompanying fragile marriages, single-parent families, ir-
responsible youthful parents, and abandoned or neglected children.
The conventions of constitutional adjudication of course demanded that
the decisions be justified, not on the basis of social stability, but in the lan-
guage of individual rights. And so they were. In Eisenstadt, the opinion for
the majority of four was a nearly incomprehensible muddle, but out of it
emerged this often-quoted sentence:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.3 0
This language, taken alone, left open the possibility of finding J.S. Mill's doc-
trine in the privacy cases. The decision was at least founded on the impor-
tance of the choice in question to the individual. But the realm of choice in-
volved was not sexual expression, but procreation, "the decision whether to
bear or beget a child. 3 1 A year later the promise implicit in this formula was
redeemed in Roe v. Wade. In that case as in Eisenstadt, the Court's opinion
stressed the importance of the choice to the individual; but again the choice
was not sexual but procreational. 32
These decisions, if viewed in isolation, thus kept alive the possibility that
the doctrine of privacy would be found to incorporate sexual freedom. The
Court would only have to find that sexual choices, like procreational ones,
were of great significance in the lives of individuals, and that no contrary col-
lective interest required the traditional restrictions. But in Roe, more than in
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
31. Id. Some have thought this passage suggests a right of sexual freedom for the unmarried,
the argument running along these lines: the Constitution protects free choice about child-bearing
for the unmarried; choices about child-bearing arise only for those who have sex; therefore tile
Constitution protects free choice about sex for the unmarried. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944 n. 12 (1978). But surely you can have a right to wear motorcycle hel-
mets when you ride a motorcycle, without having a right to ride a motorcycle. There is nothing
odd about the idea of criminals having constitutional rights. And the Court itself has continued to
insist on the disjunction between the right of access to contraceptives and the right of sexual free-
dom. See Carey v. Poptlation Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n. 5 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)
32. Roe v. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 153(1973).
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Eisenstadt, there was language that looked away from the individualist reading
of privacy. There was great stress on the role of the doctor, the expert; 33 and
there was the awkward attempt at a traditionalist argument, a long passage
meant to show that restrictions on abortion were not a cultural or historical
universal.
34
Stanley, too, was at best equivocal on the Millian interpretation of Griswold.
On the one hand, the Court did give constitutional protection to private en-
joyment of pornography, which is a sort of sexual practice disapproved by the
traditional sexual ethic, though harmless in any sense Mill would have recog-
nized. On the other hand, the sexual aspect of the case was supplemented by
the first amendment-what the Court protected was reading material, sup-
pressed because of the thoughts it stimulated. Of course, the same could be
said of all obscenity prosecutions; and indeed Stanley was widely seen as the
precursor of the Court's abandonment of its distinction between obscenity and
protected speech.35 Finally, the case involved the traditional, proprietary no-
tion of the privacy of the home. Which factors were determinative, which
makeweight?
Whatever ambivalence there was in Stanley and Eisenstadt was resolved in
1973, the year of Roe v. Wade. First, the Court refused to extend Stanley to
protect the purchase or even the personal transportation of obscene materi-
als. 36 The earlier decision was treated as meaning no more than that the
home was a sanctuary for pornography-the law must allow one to have it
there, but not to get it there. Second, in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, for the
first time the Court explicitly considered the claim that the Constitution pro-
tects the right of consenting adults to engage in any sexual practices that can-
not be shown to cause concrete harm. The Court decisively rejected the claim,
concluding that unverifiable assumptions of social harm are enough to justify
sexual prohibitions.3 1 True, the sexual practice in question was commercial,
and less private than are most sexual relations. But these factors were barely
33. The Court's formulation of the right to abortion during the first trimester is extraordi-
nary in this regard: "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to deter-
mine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy
should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abor-
tion free of interference by the State." Id. at 163.
The conception of privacy as a right of physicians to practice their profession without state in-
terference has its origins in Griswold itself; see 381 U.S. at 482. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. Twelve Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 127 n. 4
(1973) ("constitutionally protected privacy ... encompasses the intimate medical problems of family,
marriage, and motherhood.") [Emphasis added.]
34. 410 U.S. at 129-47.
35. See, e.g., D. Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenitv Law is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 185
(1969); Note, The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1257 (1969).
36. United States v. Twelve Reels, supra note 33. The Court had earlier refused to extend
Stanlev to commercial distribution, United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
37. 413 U.S. 49, 57-69 (1973).
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mentioned, and no hope was held out that truly private and noncommercial
sex would be treated differently. Even the dissenters did not urge a right of
sexual autonomy, but argued that the Court should abandon its quest for a
manageable line between obscenity and protected speech.",
In other recent cases where it might at first appear that individuality has
been upheld against conventional sexual and familial mores, a second look re-
veals that values of social cohesion have been promoted. In Boddie v. Connec-
ticut, the Court required the state to waive fees blocking access to divorce.
But the decision was explicitly based on the value of marriage (here remar-
riage) as established in Griswold.39 For the Court, divorce facilitates solemnizing
and formalizing an otherwise irregular extramarital relationship. Where the
Court has invalidated discrimination against illegitimate children, it has not
done so on the basis that the parents have done no wrong; the stress has been
on the innocence of the children, and behind the language of fairness one
senses the stabilizing concern that these children be properly socialized. 40
To summarize, the Court has consistently protected traditional familial in-
stitutions, bonds and authority against the centrifugal forces of an anomic
modern society. Where less traditional values have been directly protected,
conspicuously in the cases involving contraception and abortion, the decisions
reflect not any Millian glorification of diverse individuality, but the stability-
centered concerns of moderate conservative family and population policy.
The alternative is to see the Court as engaged in the covert promotion of
Mill's principle. The failure to carry the principle through, then, must repre-
sent a prudential guess that to place the protection of the Constitution behind
what most people still reject as unnatural sexual practices would too much
strain the Court's limited stock of public good will. Such a theory might in-
deed explain Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. 4 1 Perhaps the Court has been
surprised by the depth and persistence of the opposition to the abortion deci-
sions, and the swing justices were not ready to risk a foray into the explosive
issue of gay rights. But if Mill's principle is in the wings, why have no hints of
it appeared in opinions? At least why has the Court not taken some first step,
perhaps striking down one of the absurd "crime against nature" statutes on
vagueness grounds-a decision that would invite little public wrath outside the
lunatic fringe?
On my interpretation, the Supreme Court's attitude toward sexual free-
dom is quite different from that of the liberal academic supporters of modern
Millianism. But the Court's own attitude is not adequately captured by terms
38. Id. at 73-114.
39. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
40. This is perhaps particularly apparent in cases involving welfare, New Jersey Welfare
Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) and rights to parental support, Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
41. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975), aff'd 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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like "Victorian" or "Puritan," insofar as they imply simply a devaluation of
sexuality. Indeed, the Court can be seen as taking sex more seriously than do
the liberals.
Consider a familiar passage in the Court's first obscenity decision. The
Court said that obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social importance," so
that any benefit that might flow from it was "clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality . . .,,42 But, the Court made clear, not all ex-
plicit discussion of sex was unprotected. Why? Because "sex, a great and mys-
terious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorb-
ing interests to mankind through the ages...43
Sex is, then, not something trivial, but a "great and mysterious ... force."
Obscenity, writing designed to arouse as directly as possible this great and
mysterious force, is then not utterly unimportant; it is rather utterly without
"redeeming social importance," and it may be suppressed in the name of "the
social interest in order . . ." To paraphrase a bit, obscenity unleashes the great
and mysterious anti-social force of sexuality.
The viewpoint implicit here is not an abstruse or unfamiliar one; indeed it
is a view that has been central to modern thought and far more widely ac-
cepted in our time than contemporary versions of the liberalism of John Stu-
art Mill. It is the view identified with Freud, with Marxist theorists, and with
the central tradition of social theory stemming from Durkheim and Weber,
that modern civilization is built upon repression, particularly the repression of
sexual drives.
One of Freud's central themes was that communal life, whether in the
family or the larger society, depends directly on sexual repression. First, the
maintenance of the family depended on the incest taboo, "perhaps the most
drastic mutilation which man's erotic life has in all times experienced." 44 Be-
yond this, civilization exacted further repressions, increasing with the com-
plexity of the society, since "a large amount of the psychical energy which it
uses for its own purposes has to be drawn from sexuality."4 In the process of
bottling up sex and withdrawing the stored energy for social use as work and
achievement, Western European civilization has reached a high water mark in
repressiveness, accepting as legitimate only heterosexual, genital, nionoga-
mous sexuality. Though of course imperfectly enforced, this narrow channel
of sexual legitimacy still "cuts off a fair number . . . from sexual enjoyment,
and so becomes the source of serious injustice."'46 To defend its draconian re-
strictions "civilization behaves towards sexuality as a people or a stratum of its
population does which has subjected another one to its exploitation. Fear of a
42. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
43. Id. at 487.
44. S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 51 (J. Strachey trans., 1961).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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revolt by the suppressed elements drives it to stricter precautionary mea-
sures."
47
These restraints are necessary not only so that energy may be deflected to
work and creative achievement. The larger community requires that its mem-
bers be bound to each other by common sympathy; the energy for these
bonds can only come from "aim-inhibited libido," erotic energy deflected
from sex to desexualized social ties.4 8 These bonds are necessary to counter
the power of Eros' ancient enemy, Thanatos, the death instinct, which takes
the form of aggressiveness when turned outward:
. . [M]en are not gentle creatures who want to be loved . . thev are, on the
contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a
powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not
only a potential helper or sexual object, but someone who tempts them to
satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without
compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his posses-
sions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him.49
And:
Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's ag-
gressive instincts . .. Hence, therefore, the use of methods intended to incite
people into identifications and aim-inhibited relationships of love, hence the
restriction on sexual life . . .50
With this somber view, it is not surprising that Freud placed no very high pri-
ority on relieving the "injustices" that attend sexual repression. He saw the
history of the world as "essentially a series of race murders; '51 "we spring
from an endless ancestry of murderers, with whom the lust for killing was in
the blood."52 If man's sexual life was mutilated by civilization, civilization was
worth the price.
No other social theorist has placed quite so high a stake on the sexual re-
pressions of modern civilization as did Freud. But every thinker of the great
central tradition of the last century's social thought has seen repressed sexual-
ity and the authoritarian family structure as close to the core of our civiliza-
tion. Conservative theorists have defended repression as necessary; revolu-
tionaries have urged that society would have to be overthrown to free us from
its tyranny.
Durkheim mirrored the conservative side of Freud's thought, without any
of Freud's therapeutic concern for the injury done the individual by repres-
sion. ". . . [S]ociety cannot be formed or maintained . he wrote, unless we
47. Id.
48. Id. at 56.
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id. at 59.
51. Freud, Reflections upon War and Death, in CHARACTER AND CULTURE 125 (1963).
52. Id. at 129.
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".. . do violence to certain of our strongest inclinations. ' 53 Ethnography and
history reveal "the obscure, mysterious, forbidding character of the sexual
act."'5 4 Marriage, with its restrictions on sexual freedom, was required to
maintain society; where there was easy divorce, there was found the high sui-
cide rate characteristic of anomie and social disintegration.
55
Weber located much of the motive power behind the creation of capitalism
in the coming of Protestant, and particularly Calvinist, religion to Europe.
The effect was twofold: first, work was infused with religious significance, and
so became a calling; second, Protestant asceticism "turned with all its force
against one thing: the spontaneous enjoyment of life and all it had to
offer"-this because "[i]mpulsive enjoyment of life, which leads away both
from work in a calling and from religion, was as such the enemy of rational
asceticism . . .56 The Puritans strove toward the "strict exclusion of the erotic
. . . from the realm of toleration." And Weber argued that the "powerful
tendency toward uniformity of life, which today so immensely aids the capital-
istic interest in the standardization of production, had its ideal foundations in
the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh."5 7
What happened when capitalism became established? Weber hinted at the
process which his successors were to elaborate: the self-destruction of bour-
geois civilization through its own success. As capitalism churned forth material
wealth and promoted its characteristic cultural spirit of secular rationalism, it
undermined the religiously founded asceticism on which its structures were
based and substituted a culture characterized by relativism, materialism and
hedonism-a culture ultimately incompatible with the work ethic necessary to
sustain productive growth.5" Following the classic formulation of this view in
Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,59 Daniel Bell has re-
cently described the clash between a productive economy and a polity de-
pendent upon work and probity on the one hand, and a consumption economy
and culture stressing hedonism on the other. The resulting modern archtype
is a moral and cultural schizophrenic-organization man by day, swinger by
53. K. WOLFF (ed.), EMILE DURKHEIM, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WITH TRANSLATIONS AND A
BIBLIOGRAPHY, at 338-39 (1960).
54. S. LUKES, EMILE DURKHEIM, HIS LIFE AND WORK, A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL SURVEY, at
533 (1972).
55. Id. at 530-31; Rmile Durkheim, Le Divorce Par Consentment Mutuel, REVUE POLITIQUE ET
LITTiRAIRE, vol. V., series 5, at 549-51 (5 Mai 1906). Durkheim's tables show that the Paris sui-
cide rate was higher for divorced men than for never-married men. No statistics for women were
compiled.
56. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 166-67 (T. Parsons
trans., 1930).
57. Id. at 169.
58. Weber quoted John Wesley, who put the thesis concisely: "Religion must necessarily pro-
duce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so
will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches." Id. at 173.
59. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY chs. XI-XIV (1950).
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night.6 0 The Weberians have followed Durkheim in stressing the centrality of
the family to the motivational structure of bourgeois society; Schumpeter in
particular eloquently laments the difficulty of sustaining capitalism in a cul-
ture of rootless and often childless apartment-dwellers.6 1
On the other side, the Marxist enemies of bourgeois society have preached
a similar message from a different perspective. Engels wrote of the close ties
between the patriarchal family, sexual possessiveness and parental authority
on the one hand, and the capitalist economy on the other.62 His ideas form
the basis for a strong strand in Western Marxist thought, particularly when
combined with later Freudian ideas, as in the writings of Herbert Marcuse
and the early Wilhelm Reich. 3 These writers have argued that the humane
goal of sexual liberation could only come with the destruction of capitalism-a
view that must fortify the association of traditional sexual restrictions with ex-
isting political and economic institutions in more conservative minds.
Another strand in left-wing thought runs contrary to the standard simple
equation of capitalism with sexual and familial repression. On this view, early
capitalism requires and hence generates the traditional bourgeois family. But
that bourgeois family, close-knit, loving and emotion-laden, albeit authoritar-
ian and repressive, ultimately comes into contradiction with the development
of capitalism in its later phases. Late capitalism requires not hardworking
inner-directed Puritans, but rootless, compulsive consumers, with no emotion-
al ties except to their own narcissistic pleasures. Against this economic demand,
the traditional family poses a model of human group founded on non-market
altruistic loving relationships, and hence generates serious dissatis-
faction with the soulless late-capitalist marketplace. On this view, associated
with the writings of Christopher Lasch, it is the very sexual repres-
siveness of the family, with its Oedipal rivalries, incest taboos, and castration
anxieties, that generates the emotional intensity which sustains the family
as a "haven in a heartless world." 4 This strongly Freud-influenced view,
then, sees the sexual revolution as an ideological manifestation of late
capitalism, but shares the Weberian view that this development creates a con-
tradiction within bourgeois society.
I have spoken here of major thinkers, but the common core of their
thought about the relation between sexual restriction and society is every-
where in the air, today as in the past. For just one example, the current self-
60. D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 71-72 (1976).
61. J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 157-62.
62. F. ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE (tran. A. West
& D. Torr 4 ed. 1934).
63. See H. MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1955); W. REICH, SEX-POL: ESSAYS, 1929-1934
(1972), particularly, The Imposition of Sexual Morality, id. at 89-249; see also M. HORKHEIMER, CRITI-
CAL THEORY 99-112 (1972).
64. See C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977). For early anticipations of this line of
thought, see M. HORKHEIMER, supra note 63, at 114-17.
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help bestseller, How to Prosper During the Coming Bad Years, has an entire chap-
ter entitled "Sin Tax," arguing that the current sexual permissiveness is a
major factor in the coming breakdown of the capitalist economy. 5 The au-
thor stresses, like any good Freudian or Weberian, the necessity of a restric-
tive sexual ethic to the maintenance of a sound child-rearing structure and an
effective work ethic.
What would be the features of a contrary attitude, one that would be con-
ducive to the development of a constitutional right of sexual freedom? Such a
point of view would have two aspects: First, it would ascribe to sexuality a
considerable importance in the lives of individuals; and second, it would hold
that the way sexual relations are carried on, at least among consenting adults,
has no great effect on the welfare of society outside the sexual sphere, so that
it is reasonable to regard adults' sex lives as their own business. It is of course
the second of these two elements that the orthodox Freudian tradition denies;
sex is a vastly important thing to people, so important that we characteristic-
ally deny its importance-but the repression of sex is of even greater impor-
tance to the general welfare of society.
Another familiar attitude denies the first element, regarding sex as too
trivial a matter to deserve constitutional protection. Thus, Justice Rehnquist
has asked rhetorically in his dissent in Carey v. Population Services whether the
heroes of Bunker Hill and Shiloh died so that teenagers might have conven-
ient access to contraceptives.6 6 This denigrating attitude toward sexuality is
consistent with support for legislative repeal of the traditional sodomy, forni-
cation and adultery laws--on the basis of these laws' failure to serve any im-
portant purpose, their unenforceability, and the other familiar arguments
against "victimless crime" laws.67 The movement to abolish these laws has met
with success in recent years, and I suspect that much of the support for their
repeal has been based on these practical concerns, not on any notion that sex-
ual freedom is a human right. But the belief that sex laws represent a waste-
ful intrusion into a trivial aspect of human existence is not the sort of atti-
tude likely to lead judges to hold them unconstitutional.
Who then stands for sexual freedom? Who believes neither that sex is a
trivial though somewhat shameful matter, nor that it is a "dark and mysteri-
ous force in human affairs" that must be repressed if children are to be prop-
erly reared and work is to get done? Here and there one can find spokesmen
for such a view; for example it permeates Bertrand Russell's book on sex and
65. H. RUFF, How TO PROSPER DURING THE COMING BAD YEARS 159-167 (1979).
66. Carey' v. Population Serv. Int'l, supra note 25, at 717. Cf. Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
67. In the last fifteen years, twenty-one states have altogether repealed their laws prohibiting
homosexual activity by consenting adults, and another thirteen states have reduced the crime
from a felony to a misdemeanor. H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1156
(1979).
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the family, Marriage and Morals, published in 1929, just a year before Civiliza-
tion and its Discontents. "Sex is a natural human need like food and drink,"
wrote Russell.6 8 "Joy of life ... depends upon a certain spontaneity in regard
to sex. Where sex is repressed, only work remains, and a gospel of work for
work's sake never produced any work worth doing. '69 Modern society suffers
a paralyzing preoccupation with sex that "[niothing but freedom will pre-
vent. '70 A sexually obsessed society produces young people who are "stupid,
deceitful and timorous," 71 and parents who are "starved, hungry and eager,
reaching out to the helpless young for some fragment of the nutriment that
has been denied them .... 72
Something of the same spirit surfaces in Michel Foucault's recent History of
Sexuality. 73 Foucault's paradoxical thesis is that far from repressing a
preexisting and natural human interest in sex, nineteenth century European
civilization virtually invented sex as a topic of inquiry and concern. And twen-
tieth century efforts to liberate us from our supposedly secret-laden, hypocrit-
ical and repressive past represent but another form of ideology, in this case
the ideology of the caste of experts in sex and the family, developed to justify
their ever-increasing power over private and family life. What the cause of
liberty needs today, Foucault would argue, is not more Freudian focus upon
sexuality as a dark and mysterious force that secretly rules our lives, but the
de-emphasis of sexuality as a special subject matter and its reintegration into
the general category of human physical pleasures. He says, "We must not
think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary .... It
is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim ...to counter
the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in
their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. 74
Foucault is a master of paradox and irony, and it is a splendid paradox
that he echoes a writer who is thought of as carrying the obsession with sexu-
ality to its furthest extent, Norman 0. Brown. In Life Against Death, Brown
preaches the ideal of a culture in which Freud's death instinct no longer takes
the form of aggression, so that there is no need for repression of erotic en-
ergy to contain its force. In such a culture, Freud's Eros could reign supreme,
and human happiness would be attained in the form of complete libidinal
gratification. But in this free society, Eros would itself be freed from the nar-
row focus on genital satisfaction into which it had been channeled by our
socially-imposed repressions. It would expand to encompass the full range of
all the sensuous pleasures of which the body is capable. Brown takes his motto
68. B. RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS 291 (1929).
69. Id. at 296-97.
70. Id. at 292.
71. Id. at 103.
72. Id. at 286-87.
73. M. FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (1978).
74. Id. at 157.
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from Thoreau: "We need pray for no higher heaven than the pure senses can
furnish." 5
Leaving aside Brown's utopianism, it is clear that his idea of Eros is the
same as Foucault's "bodies and pleasures." Thus the ideals of Freud's ecstatic
disciple and his ironic critic converge. And they join with the view of the ra-
tionalist Bertrand Russell, who thought we should treat sex like the natural
desires for food and drink. In these three disparate modern prophets, one
can discern the attitude most conducive to enshrinement of sexual freedom
among our constitutional rights.
Will we have to wait until the spiritual kin of Bertrand Russell, Norman 0.
Brown and Michel Foucault make up a majority of the Supreme Court before
we see sexually repressive laws invalidated? I believe not. I expect that within
a few years fornication and sodomy laws will be found unconstitutional, on
something like the very dogma of the right of consenting adults to control
their own sex lives that the Court has until now so rigorously avoided. But the
real reasons for the decisions will have little to do with any notion in the jus-
tices' minds that sexual freedom is essential to the pursuit of happiness.
Rather the decisions will respond to the same demands of order and social
stability that have produced the contraception and abortion decisions. Thou-
sands of couples are living together today outside of marriage. The fornica-
tion laws, otherwise empty formalities as they are, stand in the way of provid-
ing a stable legal framework for handling child rearing and property
questions within these unions. 6 For this reason those laws will be struck down
in the jurisdictions which have not legislatively repealed them first.
Similarly, the homosexual community is becoming an increasingly public
sector of our society. For that community to be governed effectively, it must
be recognized as legitimate. Perhaps something like marriage will have to be
recognized for homosexual couples, not because they need it for their happi-
ness (though they may), but because society needs it to avoid the insecurity and
instability generated by the existence in its midst of a permanent and influen-
tial subculture outside the law." Effective regulation of the family and com-
munity life of gay people will require that the laws which symbolically pro-
claim their sexual identity illegitimate in the eyes of the larger society must be
eliminated. Some of the fierce conservatives in our midst will not see this con-
servative necessity, and their views will prevail in the legislatures of a few ju-
risdictions. The Supreme Court will then step in and play its traditional role
as enlightened conservator of the social interest in ordered stability, and will
strike down those laws, in the glorious name of the individual.
75. N. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH: THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL MEANING OF HISTORY 308
(1959).
76. Cf. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 668 n. 4, 557 P.2d 106, 112 n. 4, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
821 n. 4 (1976).
77. See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L. J. 573 (1973).
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APPENDIXf
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY AND SEXUAL FREEDOM: LAW REVIEW OPINION
A literature survey turned up forty-one law review articles and student notes pub-
lished between 1965 and 1979 that addressed the relationship between constitutional
privacy (as established in Griswold and successor cases) and legal prohibitions of con-
sensual adult sex (as condemned by the Wolfenden Report, the Model Penal Code,
and H.L.A. Hart; and as supported, in principle at least, by Lord Devlin). Almost all
of these articles and notes found support in the privacy cases for the libertarian posi-
tion on sexual morals legislation.
The pattern was established in the very first published commentary, the analysis of
Griswold in Harvard Law Review's annual summary of the Supreme Court Term. The
student authors summarized the opinions in the case and noted that the case might
stand onlv for the sanctity of the marital bedroom, or, somewhat more broadly, for
free choice for the married in matters of contraception. A still broader reading would
introduce the theme of sexual freedom; Griswold might stand for the "libertarian as-
sumption that if the state has no colorable interest in regulating an area of conduct, it
should be barred from doing so .. " On this assumption, it would not be permissible
to justify legal coercion "in terms of sexual morality, without reference to the social
consequences of the prohibited conduct."' Commentators have read Mill, Hart and the
libertarian tradition into the privacy cases ever since with almost no encouragement by
the Court. The Court's rigorous abstention from any support for sexual freedom in
the privacy cases has been almost universally interpreted as political and unprincipled.
A student comment on the Court's 1976 decision in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney is
typical:
The affirmance without opinion of the lower court decision is a setback
for those who had hoped the Court would take the logical step from its historic
holdings in [Griswold and Eisenstadt] . . .' [emphasis added].
Of the forty-one pieces surveyed, onlv three could be read as negative or seriously
equivocal on the question whether the Griswold-Eisenstadt doctrine, read fairly, sup-
ported aduh sexual freedom. First, in one of the earliest commentaries on Griswold,
Thomas Emerson, who had been winning counsel in the case, observed:
It seems unlikelv that the Court would disturb most of the legislation
relating to adultery, fornication . . . and homosexuality . . . . It is conceivable
that sometime in the future, as mores change and knowledge of the problem
grows, all sexual activities of two consenting adults in private will be brought
within the right of privacy.3
The purely predictive tone of the passage leaves unclear whether Professor Emerson
would regard the Court's failure to include sexual freedom within privacy as "unprin-
cipled." Perhaps, as an old legal realist, he is not given to assessments in those terms.
Second, a 1971 student note took a narrow view of the implications of privacy doc-
f Mv thanks to John Kelly for his help with the Appendix.
1. Note, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 105, 165 (1965).
2. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See also Comment, Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney: Closing the Door to a Fundamental Right of Sexual Privacv, 53 DENVER L. J.
553 (1976).
3. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 232 (1965).
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trine. Not only would Griswold "have to be extended beyond its present bounds" to in-
validate the sodomy laws, but the constitutional prohibitions of establishment of reli-
gion and cruel and unusual punishment were both more plausible grounds than
privacy for reaching the desirable end of declaring such sexual morals legislation
unconstitutional.4 Finally, another student note, this one a particularly thorough re-
view of privacy case law through 1973, argued that Griswold and Eisenstadt provided at
best equivocal support for a right of sexual freedom.5
The remaining thirty-eight pieces took the View that the better, natural, principled
reading of the privacy cases would bring the sexual relations of consentifig adults
within the protection of the constitutional right of privacy. A few of them also sug-
gested that at least some sexual prohibitions might nevertheless be upheld, as resting
upon a compelling state interest in family stability; 6 but this is entirely consistent with
the broad reading of privacy.
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